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Abstract 
The current fiscal crisis has placed unprecedented pressure on public 
procurements. A major target of future public spending cuts is likely to be defense 
expenditures. Within the defense budget, the biggest and most immediate targets 
are likely to be the acquisition of new equipment, facilities, services, and supplies. 
Addressing the growing global challenge of affordability, this paper offers a new 
approach to government’s vendor selection decisions in major public procurements. 
In the absence of profits to guide public procurement decisions, the challenge that 
faces a government buyer is to select the vendor that delivers the best combination 
of desired non-price attributes at realistic funding levels. The governance 
mechanism proposed in this paper is a multiattribute first price, sealed bid 
procurement auction. It extends traditional price-only auctions to one in which 
competition takes place exclusively over bundles of desired non-price attributes. The 
first iteration of the model is a multiattribute auction in which a fixed budget 
constraint is specified. Next, the model is expanded to incorporate a range of 
possible budget levels. This expanded model reveals the benefits to the buyer of 
defining a procurement alternative (vendor bid proposal) in terms of its value to the 
buyer over a range of possible expenditures, rather than as a single point in budget-
value space. This  new approach leads to some interesting results. In particular, it 
suggests that in a fiscally constrained environment, the traditional approach of 
eliminating dominated alternatives could lead to sub-optimal decisions. The final 
extension of the model explicitly examines the buyer’s decision problem under 
budget uncertainty. 
Keywords: Public procurement; defense acquisition; affordability; vendor 
selection; auctions; multiattribute first price, sealed bid procurement auction; vendor 
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I. Introduction 
Over the next five years, the US Department of Defense (DoD) plans to 
spend more than $357 billion on the development and procurement of major defense 
systems.  The DoD’s goal is to “achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that are 
affordable” (GAO Written Testimony, 2009).  Focusing on affordability, this paper 
describes a multiattribute first price, sealed bid procurement auction that extends 
traditional price-only auctions to one in which competition takes place exclusively 
over specific bundles of desired non-price attributes or characteristics. 
In our model, prices/costs do not appear in the value function.  Instead, the 
price appears in an affordability constraint in the spirit of cost as an independent 
variable (CAIV).  Larsen (2007) offers the following explanation of CAIV: 
All acquisition programs/issues consist of three fundamental elements: cost, 
performance and schedule.  Under CAIV, performance and schedule are 
considered a function of cost.  Cost and affordability should be a driving force 
not an output after potential solutions are established. (p. 15) 
In another context, Michael and Becker (1973) also argue for costs to be 
excluded from measures of value.  The focus of this paper is on performance and 
affordability: Vendors compete for a government contract based on their relative 
costs of producing different components of quality (attributes or characteristics), and 
based upon their unique (sunk) technology investments that define their ability to 
offer different tradeoffs among these components. 
The proposal is for the buyer (procurement agency) to provide each vendor 
(bidder) the same budget authority guidance, and to solicit its best and final offer of a 
non-price attribute bundle (e.g. for computers, vehicles, weapon systems, logistics 
packages, etc.) for the projected funding (budget) forecast issued by the procuring 
agency.  Competition between vendors takes place exclusively over collections of 
products (goods & services), and proposals are evaluated by the buyer as bundles 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 2 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
specified by the buyer, the vendor's costs for each attribute, and the production 
technology the vendor has in place to combine those attributes.   
Expanding this approach, the model is modified to allow the buyer to offer a 
range of possible budgets, soliciting proposals for each one.  This leads to the 
generation of what we call an “expansion path” for each vendor, showing how the 
vendor’s proposals change as the budget increases, and thus providing a more 
complete view of the vendor’s ability to provide performance.  This idea was also 
discussed in the context of public decisions by Hitch & McKean (1967) and Quade 
(1989).  The general motivation expressed succinctly by Keeney (2004) emphasizes: 
“If you do not have the right problem, objectives, alternatives, list of uncertainties, 
and measures to indicate the degree to which the objectives are achieved, almost 
any analysis will be worthless” (p. 200).  It is imperative for alternatives to be 
adequately described, and that any budget uncertainty be explicitly acknowledged. 
This approach can be thought of as a strategic choice of auction mechanism 
for a buyer when overall budget authorities for the program can be 
estimated/forecasted, and products are differentiated and complex.  It combines the 
competitive advantages of auctions, with the flexibility of decisions based on multiple 
attributes of a product.   
In our formulation, both the seller (vendor) and the buyer (government) suffer 
from imperfect and asymmetric information.  While the seller does not know the 
relative weights the buyer assigns to the attributes, the buyer does not know the 
sellers' costs of producing a particular attribute, nor the technologies (production 
functions) that combine those attributes into the products under consideration.   
Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005) describe the sellers' private information:  
"Seller costs can be expected to depend on [the] local manufacturing base and 
sellers can be expected to be well informed about the cost of (upstream) raw 
materials" (p. 437).  Loerch, Koury, and Maxwell (1999) discusses a Value Added 
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acquisition.  Our approach differs from theirs, in that we incorporate vendors' 
decision making into the model, along with issues of asymmetric information.  
Blondal (2006) discusses a two-stage1 bidding process, in which the procuring 
agency issues a general request, and then later issues a detailed request based on 
the responses received.  The US Federal Acquisition Regulations (2005) provided 
guidance in subpart 14.5 on a two-step process for government agencies: 
Step one consists of the request for, submission, evaluation, and (if 
necessary) discussion of a technical proposal.  No pricing is involved.  Step 
two involves the submission of sealed price bids by those who submitted 
acceptable technical proposals in step one.  Invitations for bids shall be 
issued only to those offerors submitting acceptable technical proposals in 
step one.  An objective is to permit the development of a sufficiently 
descriptive and not unduly restrictive statement of the Government's 
requirements especially useful for complex items. 
(https://www.acquisition.gov/far/html/Subpart 14_5.html) 
Our proposal is related but different than this two-step bidding process 
because the competition is over non-price attributes, and the price is captured in the 
funding (budget authority) constraint. 
Much of the multiattribute auction literature, including Che (1993), Beil and 
Wein (2003), and Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005), either implicitly or explicitly 
includes price alongside non-price attributes in the buyer's (auctioneer's) value/utility 
function.2  While this approach is appropriate in many private-sector contexts, it can 
generate complications in public procurements and defense acquisitions.  In the 
private sector, a decision-maker likely seeks to maximize profit. In the public sector 
                                            
1Blondal defined "stage" differently than we do in this paper.  We use the term to refer to a decision or 
set of decisions that depends only on exogenously given parameters and previous decisions.  For 
example, Blondal considers a government agency's offer and the vendor responses to be a single 
stage, whereas we treat these as two distinct stages.  Using our interpretation, Blondal's model is in 
fact a five-stage process. 
2Value functions are often referred to in defense procurement as measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  
The term “MOE” is used in a few different ways.  It may describe a single-attribute value function or a 
multiattribute value function, which might incorporate the whole objectives hierarchy, or only a portion 
of it.  For a detailed discussion of MOEs, see Sproles (2000). Regardless, this proposal emphasizes 
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the government is generally not permitted to make a profit.  Rather, government 
decision-makers attempt to maximize value to the public given budget constraints. 
The latter may not be known precisely throughout the entire decision process.  Two 
pioneers in defense economics, Hitch and McKean (1967), have advocated 
determining the maximum effectiveness for a given budget and examining how each 
alternative fares for several different budget levels.  Our proposal emphasizes that 
this can be carried out using a value-focused thinking approach, as discussed by 
Keeney (1992) and by Parnell (2007) in the context of national defense.  That is, it is 
important for the buyer's method of evaluation to be constructed independently of 
the particular alternatives offered. 
Finally, after the vendors' bids (attribute bundle proposals) have been 
identified for various budget levels, we expand the formulation of the buyer's 
problem to explicitly include their beliefs of the probability of various possible budget 
levels.  We apply a decisions under uncertainty approach similar to that introduced 
by Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer (1964).  In addition to expressing their beliefs of 
various budget levels as probabilities, the buyer is assigned a utility function that 
incorporates his/her risk attitudes, which enables the calculation of a new expected 
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II. Model 
Our model consists of three stages, which are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The Three-Stage Procurement Model 
The procurement agency (buyer) begins by specifying a set of attributes A 
and a budget level B.  There are m vendors, each of whom will respond with a bid.  
A bid is simply a set of attribute levels that will be produced given B.  We express 
vendor j's bid as 1 , ,j j njA a a⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦K  for 1, ,j m= K , where ija  is the level of attribute i 
offered by vendor j.  The buyer's ultimate decision (the third stage) is to select a 
vendor [1, ]j m∈ , and thus a set of attribute levels 1 , ,j j njA a a⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦K  to maximize a 
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For ease of exposition, we assume ( )jV A  is an additive, multiattribute value 
function similar to that discussed by Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Kirkwood (1997), 
although it is later demonstrated our conclusions do not require ( )jV A  to be 
additive. The use of additive multiattribute value functions requires the assumption of 
mutual preferential independence (Dyer & Sarin, 1979; Kirkwood & Sarin, 1980). 
This implies alternatives can be compared based exclusively on the set of attributes 
over which they differ, ignoring common levels of other attributes.  
For simplicity, attribute levels are treated as performance ratings on a 
constructed scale, similar to those used by Ewing, Tarantino, and Parnell (2006).  
Since it is not the central focus of our paper, another simplifying assumption is that 
the process to construct a scale that translates natural units into a value measure 
has already been accomplished.  Thus, we refer simply to ija  rather than using the 
more common notation ( )ijv a , with the understanding that ija  is an agreed-upon 
value measure.  If necessary, these measures could be specified explicitly by the 
buyer.  Finally, each attribute in the model is assumed to have a minimum value of 
zero, and a maximum value of four.   








V A w a
=
= ∑
,  (1) 
where iw  is the weight that the buyer places on attribute i.  We assume the buyer 
has an understanding of the range of attribute levels in determining the weights. 
Importantly, the weights in (1) are assumed to be private information to the buyer.  
Asker and Cantillon (2008) refer to this as an “unannounced” scoring rule (p. 78).  
The final stage of the model involves applying Equation 1 to the set of vendor bids, 
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Given a buyer-determined set of desired attributes, A, and a forecasted 
budget for the program, B, each vendor chooses to produce an attribute bundle to 
submit to the buyer that meets the budget constraint.  While vendors have private 
information about their own production capabilities and costs, since the final scoring 
rule is unannounced, they each form their own private beliefs about the likelihood of 
a bid being accepted.   
We model the formulation of these beliefs by having each vendor generate a 
best guess of the weights in the buyer's (additive) value function, which we can 
express as ( )1 , ,j j njW w w= K .  We refer to this subjective (projected) value function 
as ( )jQ A .  The higher the value of ( )jQ A , the greater the probability the vendor 
believes an attribute offer (bid) will be accepted.  Since a rational vendor will only 
offer a buyer attribute bundles they believe have the highest probability of being 
chosen, we can restrict our attention to ordinal rankings. 








Q A w a
=




TC c a B
=
= ≤∑ ,  (2) 
where total cost jTC  is the sum of the costs paid by firm j to produce each attribute 
level.  The total cost a vendor incurs to generate the attribute bundle cannot exceed 
the buyer’s budget, B.   
Individual attribute cost functions are given by ( )ij ijc a , and each one is 
increasing in aij.  Because the objective function in (2) is linear, a unique solution 
(vendor proposal) will exist, provided that ( )ij ijc a  is strictly convex for 1, ,i n= K .  
This condition is likely to be satisfied since it simply implies decreasing returns from 
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For purposes of illustration, and ease of exposition, the remainder of this 
study focuses on two vendors and two (non-price) attributes.  The two vendors may 
have different technologies to combine the two attributes, and may face different 
attribute cost functions.  The Lagrangian function to solve the vendor’s problem is 
given by 
( ) ( )( )1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2j j j j j j j j j jL w a w a B c a c aλ= + − − − , for j = 1,2.  (3) 
Since an increase in either attribute increases the vendor’s (subjective) 





∂ > 0, each 
vendor will use the maximum available budget B to produce its attribute bundle 
proposal.  In this case, first order necessary conditions for an optimum are given by 
( )




j j j ja w c aλ∂∂ = + =′  (4a) 
( )




j j j ja w c aλ∂∂ = + =′  (4b) 
( ) ( )1 1 2 2 0jjL j j j jB c a c aλ∂∂ = − − = ,  (4c) 
where Equation 4c simply asserts that the entire budget is being used.  Solving 
Equation 4a and Equation 4b yields 
( ) ( )
1 2
1 1 2 2
j j
j j j j
w w
c a c a
=′ ′ , (5) 
meaning the optimum strategy for each vendor is to choose a bid that uses the 
entire budget for which the two attributes have equal ratios between the vendor’s 
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buyer and the vendor’s marginal cost of producing that attribute.3 With two 
competing vendors, there will be two bids, represented by attribute bundles: ( )11 21,a a  
and ( )12 22,a a . The buyer ultimately selects the vendor that maximizes its private 
value function, V.   
Of course, the subjective assessment by a vendor of the buyer’s marginal 
valuation of a particular attribute, ijw , is likely to differ among vendors.  Similarly, the 
marginal cost of producing a particular attribute, ijc
' , is also likely to vary across 
vendors.  Multiattribute auctions allow vendors to differentiate themselves in the 
auction process and to bid on their competitive advantages (Wise & Morrison, 2000).
                                            
3Note that Equation 5 has a unique solution for each vendor when the entire budget is being used.  
Because both cost functions are increasing and strictly convex, as we move along the budget 
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III. Multiple Budgets and Expansion Paths 
With the basic model in place, we now demonstrate how a buyer could more 
fully explore important differences between vendors.  Rather than the buyer 
specifying a budget B, the buyer could specify a set of (increasing) budgets 1, , kb bK  
to tease out which vendors might be favored under different budget scenarios. 
Each vendor goes through the process described in Section II with k different 
budget estimates, each time producing a bid that satisfies Equation 5 for each of the 
k possible budgets.  This set of bids from a vendor constitutes an expansion path.  It 
tells the buyer precisely how a vendor’s bid will change as the budget constraint is 
relaxed (or tightened). For purposes of illustration, throughout the remainder of the 
paper, we will use a set of six possible budget levels to simulate alternative possible 
funding constraints, for example ($5mil, $10mil, $15mil, $20mil, $25mil, $30mil) or 
simply (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30). 
Consider the following convenient functional form for the attribute cost 
functions: 
( ) ij ijaij ij ijc a eβα= , , 0ij ijα β >  for 1, 2i = , 1, 2j = .  (6) 
Desirable characteristics of this particular functional form are that each cost function 
is increasing and convex.  In Equation 6, the exponent ijβ  determines the convexity 
of each cost function.  Although the results of the study do not depend on this 
specific cost function, it offers a relatively simple way to illustrate our new approach 
to government’s vendor selection decisions. 
Expansion paths (attribute bundle proposals for different budgets) can differ 
among vendors for two reasons. The parameters of their cost functions can differ 
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The first case assumes both vendors believe the buyer will place equal 
weights on the two attributes, but that they differ in their capabilities to produce those 
attributes.  Specifically, 
11 21 11 21 12 22 12 22 11 122.0, 0.6, 1.0, 1.0, 0.7, 0.7w wα α β β α α β β= = = = = = = = = = .  (7) 
Equation 7 is symmetric in the sense that neither vendor specializes in producing a 
particular attribute.  This symmetry assumption is convenient and will be used 
throughout this section. It also illustrates that while asymmetric vendor production 
and cost parameters in the production of bundles of attributes is sufficient to 
illustrate the benefits of the expansion path approach, it is not necessary.   
Applying the parameters in (7), results in the expansion paths shown in 
Figure 2.  The two piecewise linear expansion paths, one for each vendor, are based 
on the six possible budget levels.4  They illustrate optimum combinations of 
attributes that can be produced by each vendor, and offered to the buyer, for the 
different budget levels. 
                                            
4 Fitting a curve to the points might also be a reasonable approach.  We used a piecewise linear form 
because we specifically wanted every attribute bundle in the vendor's bid to fall on the expansion 
path, as we believe this makes the method more transparent.  We would advise the analyst and the 


























Figure 2. Expansion Paths for Differing Cost Functions 
(Note. This graph shows the expansion paths for two vendors with differing 
cost functions as the budget increases from 5 to 30.  The markers of 
increasing size show each vendor’s attribute bundle proposals as the budget 
increases in increments of 5.) 
The second case assumes vendors face the same cost functions, but have 
different beliefs about the buyer’s attribute weights.  Specifically, suppose the 
vendors have the following parameter values: 
11 21 12 22 11 21 12 22 11 122.0, 0.6, 0.5, 0.7w wα α α α β β β β= = = = = = = = = = . (8) 
That is, Vendor 2 believes the buyer will place a slightly greater weight on Attribute 
1, while Vendor 1 believes the weights placed on Attribute 1 and Attribute 2 will be 


























Figure 3. Expansion Paths for Differing Beliefs 
(Note. Expansion paths for two vendors with differing beliefs on  
attribute weights as the budget increases from 5 to 30.  The markers of 
increasing size show each vendor’s attribute bundle proposals as the budget 
increases in increments of 5.) 
While the parameters assumed in (7) and (8) provide interesting cases where 
vendors differ either in their costs or in their beliefs, a third case is possible—when 
two vendors differ in both their costs and their beliefs.  Consider two vendors with 
11 21 11 21 12 22 12 22 11 122.0, 0.6, 1.0, 1.0, 0.5, 0.7w wα α β β α α β β= = = = = = = = = = .  (9) 


























Figure 4. Expansion Paths for Differing Beliefs and Cost Functions 
(Note. Expansion paths for two vendors with differing costs and  
beliefs on attribute weights.  The markers of increasing size show each 
vendor’s attribute bundle proposals as the budget increases in increments of 
5.) 
At relatively high budgets, Vendor 1 dominates Vendor 2.  Under optimistic 
assumptions about future budgets, regardless of the buyer's preferences, Vendor 1 
will be preferred and selected as the winner (provided the buyer’s value function is 
monotonically increasing in each attribute). An important consideration is that a 
static comparison that begins by assuming a relatively high fixed budget would 
eliminate Vendor 2 from further consideration. For example, in a static evaluation of 
the two vendors with a projected budget level of 20 (i.e. $20 million), Vendor 2 would 
be eliminated from further consideration. However, what is critical to note in Figure 4 
is that the reverse would be true with a low budget. Vendor 2 dominates Vendor 1 at 
lower budget levels.  
In fact, under severe budget constraints (e.g. $5 million), regardless of the 
buyer's preferences, Vendor 2 will be preferred and selected as the winner (provided 
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insights of this study is that if a government buyer believes a significant budget cut is 
possible, identifying a dominant alternative under the optimistic budget scenario (i.e. 
Vendor 1) may be misleading, and the dominated alternative (Vendor 2) may in fact 
be the preferred vendor. This suggests a new approach to government’s vendor 
selection decisions.    
To clearly illustrate this new approach, we first assign attribute weights to the 
buyer's value function.  Suppose the buyer assign a weight of 0.7 to Attribute 1 and 
0.3 to Attribute 2.  The two vendors' bids illustrated in Figure 4 can then be plotted 
as curves in ”budget-value” (or cost-effectiveness) space: 
b'








Figure 5. Value by Budget Level 
(Note. Value provided by each vendor's bid for various budget levels.) 
Related to the expansion paths, these bids are piecewise linear curves.  We 
can think of each one as a function expressing the value of the attribute bundles 
each vendor will provide over the range of possible budget levels.  We will write this 
function for vendor i as Ωi(b), defined for all possible budget levels b.   
It is clear from Figure 5 that Vendor 1 dominates the competition for any 
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budget above the switch-point, b > b’.  This observation suggests, as Quade (1989) 
argued, rethinking the typical definition of dominance, which refers to points (not 
functions) in cost-effectiveness space.   
Viewing alternatives as functions (instead of points) in budget-value space 
reveals the traditional definition of dominance can be misleading.  For example, 
consider offers from Vendor 1 and Vendor 2 based on very optimistic budgets above 
b’.  A traditional technique focusing on points and not functions would likely eliminate 
Vendor 1, as Vendor 2 provides greater value.  Yet, it is clear from Figure 5 that 
eliminating Vendor 1 prematurely could lead to a less desirable outcome if 
subsequent budget cuts result in actual budgets somewhere in the range of 0 < b < 
b’. 
This switching point (or crossover) phenomenon occurs as a result of 
differences in the two vendors’ expansion paths. There is nothing unique about the 
particular functions chosen in our example; they were selected for simplicity and 
ease of exposition.  The same results can be demonstrated with non-additive forms 
of the buyer’s value function. Moreover, non-linear interactions between attributes 
are likely to magnify this effect.5   
The sensitivity of vendor selection decisions to the budget is a fundamental 
result that arises in a wide variety of defense acquisition decision contexts. In many 
countries, budget uncertainty is growing, placing a premium on affordability. In the 
increasingly constrained fiscal environment generated by the global financial crisis, 
we recommend this new approach to government’s vendor selection decisions be 
urgently adopted and widely applied. 
                                            
5For example, consider a multiplicative value function, and suppose that one vendor has to incur a 
large cost to provide anything above the minimum level for one particular attribute.  This vendor will 
offer bids of little to no value for low budgets, but, depending on cost functions, may offer very 
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IV. Budget Uncertainty 
A natural extension of the model is to consider a procurement auction in 
which the buyer assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible budgets.  If 
the buyer believes that the realized budget will be b with probability p(b), or, in the 
continuous case, that b has a probability density function, f(b), then the 
government's vendor-selection problem can be examined using a decisions under 
uncertainty approach. 
This adds another interesting layer to the problem: We must now include the 
buyer’s risk attitude because (s)he will be evaluating gambles over multiple possible 
values.  We express risk attitudes through a utility function U, which takes the overall 
multiattribute value measure as its argument (see Chapter 7 of Kirkwood, 1997, for 
details).  Thus, the government buyer would like to select a vendor i to maximize 
( ) ( )( )i
b
p b U bΩ∑ ,  (10) 
or in the continuous case, to maximize 
( ) ( )( )if b U b dbΩ∫ .  (11) 
Consider the buyer and vendors’ information used to generate Figure 5.  That 
is, the buyer places weights of 0.7 and 0.3 on Attributes 1 and 2 respectively, while 
vendor characteristics are given by the parameters in (9).  Now suppose the buyer 






−= − ,  (12) 
                                            
6 We chose the exponential function because it has constant absolute risk aversion, measured by a 
risk tolerance parameter (in this case, 0.5), and because it is commonly used in decisions under 
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where z represents the overall value of an attribute bundle, scaled to vary between 
zero and one. The function and parameters given by Equation (12) represent a 
decision-maker who is modestly risk averse.  In this case, z = 0 corresponds to the 
value provided by Vendor 1 with a budget of 5 (the lowest possible budget), and z = 
1 corresponds to the value provided by Vendor 1 with a budget of 30 (the largest 
possible budget).  Note that U(z) will also vary between zero and one. 
Consider an optimistic, pessimistic and most likely budget. Assume the buyer 
believes the most likely budget, with a probability of 0.6, is b = 15.  Similarly, 
suppose the buyer estimates the probability of a pessimistic budget, b = 5 is 0.2, and 
that the probability of an optimistic budget, b = 20, is also 0.2.   
Figure 6 illustrates the utility values to the buyer of each vendor's attribute 
bundle proposals under the three different budget scenarios by overlaying them on 















Figure 6. Bid Utilities 
(Note. The buyer's utility function and each vendor's attribute bundle 
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Given these probabilities and this particular buyer's preferences, the expected 
utility if Vendor 1 is selected is 0.673, as opposed to 0.703 if Vendor 2 is selected.  
While this aggregate result suggests our buyer should select Vendor 2, 
disaggregating the vendor selection problem offers additional insights. 
The bundle of attributes provided by Vendor 1 would be more desirable for 
both the most likely and the optimistic budgets, but it turns out Vendor 1’s attribute 
bundle would be far less desirable in the pessimistic case.  Moreover, the expected 
values of the two bids are nearly identical. Such a conclusion would be nearly 
impossible to foresee when presented only with a single bid from each vendor for 
the single budget, b = 15.  More careful and robust analysis is only feasible if the 
buyer solicits bids from the vendors over multiple possible budget levels.   
If a vendor’s bid consists of a single attribute bundle, then constructing a 
gamble over possible overall values is extremely difficult.  A decisions under 
uncertainty approach requires that the decision-maker place a value on all possible 
outcomes, and the auction framework advocated in this paper ensures that these 
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V. Conclusion 
The current fiscal crisis has placed unprecedented pressure on public 
procurements. A major target of future public spending cuts is likely to be defense 
expenditures. Within the defense budget, the biggest and most immediate targets 
are likely to be the acquisition of new equipment, facilities, services, and supplies. 
Addressing the growing global challenge of affordability, this paper offers a 
new approach to government’s vendor selection decisions in major public 
procurements. The paper describes a simple three-stage, multiattribute procurement 
process for public vendor-selection decisions.  It allows the buyer to incorporate the 
government’s preferences over multiple attributes, and it allows each vendor to offer 
their best possible bid based on a budget estimate for the program, and on each 
vendor's cost structure and private beliefs. The model operationalizes a version of 
the popular concept of “Cost as an Independent Variable” (CAIV).  The results of this 
study reveal the importance of including price/costs as part of a budget constraint, 
rather than in the buyer's value/utility function.   
The basic model is first extended to allow vendors to submit bids for a range 
of possible budget levels.  This extended model leads to the generation of an 
expansion path for each vendor. The expansion paths illustrate how vendors’ bids 
improve as budgets increase. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that a vendor 
whose bid is dominated at one particular budget level can easily end up being the 
winner at another budget level. This makes it of vital importance for procurement 
agencies to rethink their traditional bid solicitations. Instead of viewing each vendor 
as a single point in cost-effectiveness space, it is critical to view each vendor as a 
curve in budget-value space.  In an economic environment in which affordability is a 
growing priority and where budgets are likely to change over time, this expanded 
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Finally, given the growing uncertainty over federal budgets, we explicitly 
model vendor selection as a decision under uncertainty.  In this case the buyer 
assigns a probability distribution over all possible budget levels (e.g. optimistic, 
pessimistic, and most likely), while a utility function captures the buyer’s attitude 
towards risk.  This methodology enables buyers to generate expected utilities from 
vendor proposals, providing a valuable new approach and metric for government’s 
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